Secure Multi-Execution (SME) is a promising solution for precise automatic information flow control that can be used to transform potentially vulnerable programs into secure variants. However, due to the multi-execution, it comes with high resource demands. Recently proposed efficient optimizations of SME, such as Faceted Secure Multi-Execution (FSME) and Demand-Driven Secure Multi-Execution (DDSME), unfortunately cannot uphold the same level of security with regards to attacks on the timing-channel. In this paper, we propose a novel, queue-based synchronization scheme for DDSME (Q-DDSME) that guarantees (indirect) termination-and timing-sensitive non-interference. To show that our improvement is applicable to existing programs, we implemented a Q-DDSME prototype for compiled code and provide evidence that it is (i) more efficient than unoptimized SME in realistic scenarios, (ii) guarantees (indirect) termination-and timing-sensitive non-interference, and (iii) preserves per-channel transparency. This is an important result that shows that more efficient solutions can be used without sacrificing security.
INTRODUCTION
The increasing digitalization of society rests on our collective trust in the secure processing of confidential data by our software systems. This motivates the continued research for automated information flow control methods. For the development of new components, analysis methods exist to understand security problems and catch them early on. For example, security type systems [19] , program Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. dependence graphs [12] , or self-composition [3] detect potential violations of confidentiality policies such as non-interference [10] . Violating parts can then be repaired during the development phase. These approaches are less well-suited, however, in situations where the full program is not available during development. For example, in the case of extensible systems such as web browsers or dynamic languages such as JavaScript, dynamic approaches may be more suited [20] . This is also true for reused components. With most legacy code shipped in compiled form and the known issues regarding static analysis of binaries [2, 5, 14, 22] , it is unlikely that the same methods can be applied here. However, when applied at run-time, the security-by-correction approach suffers from fundamental limitations. First, the limited precision in the detection of actual violations typically leads to low permissiveness, meaning that some secure programs are falsely rejected. Filtering these out would require constant monitoring by security experts. This situation is also unlikely to improve, as non-interference is a 2-safety [24] or hyperproperty [7] , which cannot be detected precisely using static or dynamic approaches [18] . Second, sophisticated repair that goes beyond termination of the execution following a detection is also not trivial. Sensitive data may have spread throughout the memory before any leakage is detected, which thwarts precise scrubbing [25] . As a result, the repaired execution may show unexpected behavior (also called intransparent in this context).
Fortunately, non-interference can be enforced by binary rewriting [11] . Here, the repair is applied to any program, skipping the unsatisfiable need for precise detection. This can ensure confidentiality in existing components when there is no confidence in their security. The transformed component inherits the security guarantees from the transformation function and can thus guarantee secu-Secure Multi-Execution and cheaper methods at run-time to avoid expensive enforcement on benign executions.
The problem for these efficient methods is to ensure that no side-channels are created when switching back from Secure Multi-Execution enforcement.
In this paper, we demonstrate that DDSME does in fact leak information on the termination-and timing-channels when using the standard barrier-based synchronization. We then propose a novel, queue-based synchronization mechanism and reason that it lifts the security guarantees of DDSME to (indirect) terminationand timing-sensitive non-interference (ITSNI). Additionally, we implemented a DDSME prototype with our novel synchronization mechanism in place and provide evidence that it is (i) applicable to compiled programs, (ii) still more efficient than unoptimized SME in realistic scenarios, (iii) guarantees the same level of security, and (iv) preserves per-channel transparency. This is an important achievement that shows that automatic enforcement of software confidentiality for exiting code can be efficient, secure, and transparent at the same time.
The results of our work show that it is possible to enforce confidentiality automatically for legacy code shipped in compiled form. This is an important result for three reasons. First, high-level code does not reflect the actual behavior of a program. Since it is an abstraction of the machine code, high-level code suffers from the WYSINWYX-phenomenon [2] . Second, language-specific solutions come at a loss of generality. However, every high-level language must eventually be compiled to machine code, making low-level solutions more general. Third, most programs or components are still shipped in closed-source form. Hence, the source code is often unavailable. Consequently, enforcing confidentiality for machine code provides a truthful, general, and applicable solution.
In the next section, we outline some background including Demand-Driven Secure Multi-Execution (DDSME). We then show how DDSME with barrier-based synchronization is vulnerable to covert attacks via the termination-and timing-channel in Section 3. This motivates our new, queue-based synchronization scheme, introduced in Section 4. We evaluate our implementation of our approach in Section 5, followed by a discussion of related works in Section 6. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7.
BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide a definition of non-interference as the security policy in question, outline Secure Multi-Execution (SME) as a potential enforcement method, and introduce barrier-based Demand-Driven Secure Multi-Execution (DDSME) as an efficient optimization of SME. In the next Section, we outline covert attacks on DDSME to motivate our novel queue-based synchronization introduced in Section 4.
Computation Model
We consider the class of deterministic, input-neutral, reactive programs. We denote the set of reachable states by a program p by S(p). As usual [17] , we model programs as input-output labeled transition systems, where transitions are labeled with observable actions a. An observable action a is defined as a := • | c?v | c!v, where • is a silent event and c?v (c!v) denotes input (output) of value v ∈ V via channel c ∈ C. We write s a − → s ′ when s reaches s ′ performing a. We omit s ′ if we are not interested in the exact successor state. Then, we define deterministic and input-neutral programs as follows.
Here, input-neutral means that a program that is ready to accept a value v on channel c must also be ready to accept any other value on the same channel. Deterministic is defined as usual. From a state s, a program can exhibit two different behaviors only if these are due to different inputs. Otherwise, any action taken by the program leads to equivalent successor states.
We denote the trace of a execution s 0
− −−− → s n from state s 0 to state s n asâ = a 0 .a 1 . . . . .a n−1 . We write s 0â − →, to indicate that a traceâ from state s 0 exists in the LTS. We writeâ[i] to denote the ith action in the trace. Because we consider reactive programs, every such trace is infinite. Definition 2.2. We say two tracesâ 1 ,â 2 agree on input ( * =?) or output ( * =!) via channel c, denotedâ 1 = c * â2 iff
It should be obvious that ∀s ∈ S(p) : ∀â 1 ,â 2 : sâ
Naturally it holds thatâ 1 =â 2 =⇒ (∀c :â 1 = c!â2 ).
Noninterference
There are various ways to describe secure information flow policies [6] . In our work, we focus on the wide-spread policy of noninterference [10] . In our definition, a program p is non-interferent if all executions that agree on unclassified input also agree on unclassified output. Channels are classified, denoted π (c) = ℓ, according to a finite security lattice (L, ⊑), where ℓ ∈ L. As others before us, we assume an extension of the lattice order to a total order as given [9] . We extend the definition of agreeing inputs and output on channels to security levels, such that it includes all channels on lower levels. Hence,â 1 = ℓ * â2 ⇔ (∀c : π (c) ⊑ ℓ =⇒â 1 = c * â2 ). Then, we can define non-interference based on I/O-equivalence.
Note also that, for deterministic programs,â 1 = ⊤?â2 =⇒â 1 = a 2 =⇒â 1 = ⊤!â2 holds.
Our definition is timing-sensitive in the sense that traces are compared without projecting out high events. Consequently, traces such as L!1.H !5.L!2 and L!1.L!2 are deemed distinguishable for a low observers. The reasoning is that the late arrival of the L!2-event leaks information about intermediate computation of high events.
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Secure Multi-Execution
Because non-interference is a 2-safety property [24] , it extends to programs if all pairs of traces are non-interferent. Unfortunately, it is usually highly non-trivial to enumerate all possible traces of a program. Consequently, precise verification of non-interference for any program is similar to proving behavioral equivalence, which is known to be Π 2 -hard [11] . This can be circumvented by shifting the goal from detection to enforcement, which can be done using binary rewriting systems. A binary rewriter is a transformation function T : P → P that takes a program as input and yields a derivative program as output. After transformation of a potentially ℓ-interferent program p, it can be guaranteed that ϕ ℓ (T ℓ (p)). T ℓ can be constructed such that
This means that T ℓ replaces all classified inputs with a constant dummy value δ . Because our programs are input-neutral, they must accept this value. The transformation guarantees noninterference, because ∀â 1 ,â 2 :
holds. To ensure that the derivative of a program is still meaningful, the transformation function must also guarantee some form of transparency. This implies that the transformed behavior of a secure program p should be approximately equivalent to the original behavior (∀p : ϕ ℓ (p) =⇒ p ≈ ℓ T (p)). The typical requirement here is that the transformation preserves per-channel transparency, meaning ϕ ℓ (p) =⇒ p = ℓ! T (p). Without transformation, this is implied by non-interference. Obviously, the above transformation does not guarantee per-channel transparency on its own.
To overcome this problem, Devriese and Piessens introduced Secure Multi-Execution (SME) [9] . As the name suggests, SME works by executing the same code multiple times -once for each level in the security lattice. Each execution gets input only from channels with equal or lower classification. Additionally, each execution produces output only on channels at its own level. This is equivalent to applying our transformation T ℓ , with the addition of an outputfilter, to a program for all ℓ ∈ L. The exact semantics are given in Figure 1 . For simplicity, we assume that enough resources are available to execute the derivatives in parallel. This is similar to using the fair interleaving scheduler from [17] .
Due to the parallel composition, the trace of an SME-transformed program is also a list of vectors, indexed by ℓ. SME guarantees security on each level by construction of the transformer and perchannel transparency as for each channel there exists an execution that is responsible for the output. This execution has access to all necessary information, as the original trace is non-interferent and thus classified information can be replaced with dummy values.
Unfortunately, due to the parallel composition, SME is not very efficient. Because SME runs multiple copies in parallel, the same progress in a single trace execution now takes the sum of all parallel traces. As the transformation of the traces might lead to divergence between the original and the transformed execution, it is not easy to define equivalent progress. Some traces might even make faster progress due to the dummy value replacement. However, such effects are rather coincidental and are probably not usable for a systematic increase in efficiency.
Yet, the efficiency can be increased if the program is partitioned prior to execution, such that each level only executes the corresponding slice of the program [13] . Then, some traces could be shortened which lowers the multiplication factor overall. However, sound static program partitioning, especially for low-level languages, is highly non-trivial [23] . Hence, for Demand-Driven Secure Multi-Execution, instead of partitioning the program, the execution is partitioned in critical and non-critical sections. This makes it more efficient than full SME, as described next.
Demand-Driven SME
Recently, we introduced an efficient version of Secure Multi-Execution (SME) together with an implementation for enforcement of compiled binaries on Unix-like systems [16] . Our Demand-Driven Secure Multi-Execution (DDSME) avoids using costly SME enforcement whenever possible and only switches to SME mode on demand.
Overall, the combination of lightweight single-execution monitoring, fast ahead-of-time static analysis, and dynamic multiplication promises a better balance between precise security, per-channel transparency and efficiency. In this section, we give a short introduction to Demand-Driven Secure Multi-Execution, describe how it achieves progress-sensitive non-interference, and why it is more efficient than SME. Because it is sufficient for the purposes of this paper and simplifies the examples, we assume the typical two-level security lattice {L, H }, where L ⊏ H . Extension of our technique to more complex lattices is left for future work. We call the execution that is responsible for output at a high security level the high execution. The execution responsible for output on channels with low classification is called low execution, respectively.
The primary observation that drives the DDSME optimization is that the program derivatives combined in SME actually execute the same states for large parts of many typical executions. As long as no classified input has been provided, due to the combination of equivalent unclassified inputs and deterministic programs, all executions are in the same states. This part of the execution, which for example covers much of the start-up phase of a process, is called secretless. We write ϕ sl e (â) to denote that a trace is secretless. Whether ϕ sl e holds is a safety problem and can thus be validated by single-execution monitoring. The detector ϕ sl e (a) for secretless-execution monitoring (SLEM) is defined aŝ ϕ sl e (a) := (a = c?v) =⇒ (π (c) = L). Since this enforcement method does not require multiplied execution, it is far more efficient than SME. Once classified inputs are received by the program (i.e., ¬φ sl e (a) holds for s a − →), DDSME dynamically switches to SME enforcement, to guarantee non-interference beyond secretless executions. Details of the necessary implementation tricks to achieve dynamic process multiplication can be found in the original paper [16] .
Since many executions eventually stop using the secret information (or stop emitting output altogether), additional resources can be saved by reverting back to single-execution monitoring once this is satisfied by all derivatives. At this point the derivative states have Session: Privacy CCSW '19, November 11, 2019, London, United Kingdom Figure 1 : Transformer Semantics not necessarily converged into the same state. After all, the different input may have lead to diverging paths and different values may reside in memory. However, if it can be shown that all eventually observable events on low channels will only depend on parts on the memory that are still equal among all derivatives, then the states can be assumed as converged. As detection of such a situation requires knowledge about the future, we propose ahead-of-time static analysis to derive criticality constraints ψ that describe when such a state is reached [16] . This is no easy task on low-level code, however, it can be safely over-approximated. Since this information is not used for detection of leaks, but rather to restrict the use of expensive enforcement, falsely flagging secure sections is acceptable here. One comparably simple way to over-approximate these situations is to use the control-flow information to find locations after which no further output is produced. After all, any program that produces no output is trivially secure. More precise critical sections may be created by manual or more sophisticated analyses. Because this paper concerns a subtlety in the way DDSME reverts back to SLEM that gives rise to termination-and timing-channels, we continue with an introduction of the barrier synchronization, as used in [16] , [21] , and [17] (regarding full transparency for SME). We then illustrate the increase in efficiency with a short example in Section 2.6 and continue by illustrating covert attacks on DDSME and our solution for the problem.
Barrier-Based DDSME
The problem discussed in this paper arises from the way DDSME switches back to Secretless-Execution Monitoring (SLEM) after Secure Multi-Execution (SME) enforcement. In the original paper, barrier-based synchronization is used [16] as, for example, discussed in [17] . Schmitz et al. [21] implicitly use a barrier but add timeouts to thwart termination attacks. We discuss the use of timeouts in Section 3 and proceed without them.
As the name suggests, the barrier-based synchronization scheme waits for all executions in SME mode to terminate execution of the critical section and only then switches back to SLEM mode. The idea is to start the execution in a single state s. We assume that the attacker has access to the binary and thus the initial memory is considered unclassified. Thus, any execution is assumed to be initially secretless. It is then executed under secretless-execution monitoring (SLEM). In this phase, the original program is run, meaning that the execution can produce output on all channels. Consequently, the execution is transparent as it is equivalent to normal execution. It is also secure, as no secret information has been obtained yet. When input is obtained from a classified channel, the single state s is multiplied according to number of levels in the security lattice and continues SME semantics. This means that the executions are transformed according to the rules in Figure 1 . Hence, low output from the high execution is suppressed as is high output from the low execution. Additionally, high input is replaced for the low execution, such that two different input events c?v and c?δ are created. Recall that our programs are assumed to be input-neutral and therefore must accept any δ whenever they accept v. When entering SME mode, a barrier is added, denoted as the set B ⊆ L. Initially, the barrier is empty as no execution has left the critical section yet.
During SME mode, the criticality constraint ψ is checked for each execution. This is done using individual execution monitoring on each level. Once an execution has reached the end of the critical section, it is added to the barrier B. This execution is then suspended while execution of the remaining derivatives continues. Once the barrier has collected all executions (B = L), the high execution is discarded and execution continues with the low execution under SLEM protection.
There is an important subtlety to using the low state to instantiate the SLEM mode after leaving the SME mode. If the low execution is used here, then security is guaranteed because the SLEM state cannot contain secret information that could be leaked on the low channel. If, on the other hand, the SLEM state was instantiated using the high execution, secret information contained therein may flow through the SLEM state to a low channel. In other words, continuing with the low state is similar to scrubbing all secret information from the high execution. The downside of this lies in transparency. If the critical section is not sound, the high may be discarded prematurely. Subsequent high output is then created by the oblivious SLEM state and may contain wrong information (or not appear at all). Hence, we assume that the critical section is always sound.
To illustrate the improved efficiency of DDSME over SME, we next provide a short example. We then demonstrate the terminationand timing-insensitivity of DDSME by outlining covert attacks in Session: Privacy CCSW '19, November 11, 2019, London, United Kingdom Section 3. In Section 4, we introduce our solution to this problem and evaluate our prototype in Section 5.
Comparison with SME
To illustrate the operation of Secure Multi-Execution (SME) in comparison to barrier-based Demand-Driven Secure Multi-Execution (DDSME), we consider the short example in Figure 2 . In the example, a value is read in from a classified channel and stored in the variable x. Then, this value is emitted on both the unclassified and classified channel. Finally, a constant value of 0 is emitted on the unclassified channel indefinitely. The program is obviously interferent. As the value obtained from a classified channel is directly written to an unclassified channel, an attacker could directly infer the classified information from observing the unclassified channel. In the middle, we show how SME enforces non-interference for this program. Here, the high input to the low channel is replaced by the dummy value δ in the low execution. Consequently, the low execution emits the dummy value δ instead of the real secret next. Thus, an attacker cannot obtain the secret from observation of the low channel. Because the original program is not secure, we do not have to guarantee perchannel transparency. Hence, the change in observable behavior on the low channel is allowed. Because we use two levels, the SME execution uses twice the execution steps of the original execution and will continue to do so even though the secret will never be used again.
This is unnecessary wasteful, as an analysis of the code could show. Using dependence graphs or other means of static information flow analysis, it can be determined that classified information obtained in line one is not used beyond the code in line three. Hence, the critical section contains only the first three lines (highlighted in the code). The criticality condition is thus ψ (s) = s.pc ∈ {1, 2, 3}, where s.pc denotes the current program counter. As depicted on the right, DDSME starts with SLEM protection of the original execution. Due to the high input in line one, enforcement switches to SME mode. Both executions enter the critical section and the input to the low execution is again replaced with δ . Execution then continues with SME semantics until both executions reach the end of the critical section, marked by the barrier. Once both executions have reached the barrier, the execution switches back to more efficient SLEM mode. Since the critical section is never entered again, ϕ sl e holds for the rest of the execution. Thus, it can remain in singleexecution mode indefinitely, saving all the resources of the second copy.
In this example, using DDSME is just as secure as SME but allows to continue with only half the overhead. Unfortunately, things are not always as simple. In the next section, we describe how information can be leaked from DDSME through covert channels, followed by the introduction of our novel synchronization method to thwart such attacks in Section 4.
ATTACKS ON DDSME
The problem with the barrier-based scheduling for Demand-Driven Secure Multi-Execution (DDSME) is that it is neither terminationnor timing-sensitive. This is a consequence of the barrier synchronization that requires executions from both levels to leave the critical section before it can be switched back to single-execution enforcement. Consequently, all observable events which are created after the critical section become dependent on the executions in the critical section. In this section, we outline how an attacker may abuse these implied dependencies to perform termination-and timing-attacks on barrier-based DDSME. The idea is to introduce specific delays in the critical section such that high input interferes with the timing of subsequent low outputs. In the next section, we introduce a novel scheduling scheme that resolves these dependencies while retaining per-channel transparency guarantees.
Termination-Channel Attack
The termination-attack on barrier-based DDSME exploits the fact that DDSME can only switch back to single-execution monitoring after both executions reached the barrier. Consequently, if a situation can be created where reaching the barrier depends on the private inputs, they may interfere with subsequent public outputs. To illustrate such an attack, we consider the code snippet in Figure 3 .
The attack first reads in a classified bit and emits it on the unclassified channel. Without enforcement, this is clearly interferent. With Secure Multi-Execution enforcement, this statement serves to leak the dummy value on the low channel. The attack then proceeds with a potentially infinite loop to allow for diversion, depending on the classified information. The statement in line five, where the secret is emitted on a classified channel, is added to ensure that the loop is part of the critical section. Finally, a constant is emitted on the unclassified channel, which creates an observable event on the low channel right after the barrier.
The right hand side of the figure shows a successful terminationattack. We assume that Alice authored the code shown in Figure 3 and that she can observe events on the low channel. First, she observes an output of ⊥. She now knows the dummy value that was used to replace the private input in the low execution (δ = ⊥). Because she has knowledge of the code, she can expect the low execution to progress to the barrier within the next few instructions. Therefore, she expects to see the zero output on the low channel within a short time frame. From the continued absence of this output, she can infer that the high execution has not progressed to the barrier. Thus, the private input must have been ⊤.
Note that this allows Alice to categorize the private input according to the equivalence classes implied by the conditional from the loop in line three. However, it can only be executed until the program reaches a divergent state in either execution. The weakness here is it that the attack only works correctly if the dummy values falsify the conditional. Yet, the choice of the dummy value is not under Alice's control. If the dummy values satisfy the conditional, the non-termination cannot be attributed to the private inputs 1 . Consequently, this attack is only really useful if Alice can ensure that the code is executed many times. Even then, the terminationattack suffers from the inevitable semi-decidability of its success. In contrast to this, we introduce a timing-attack next that allows to potentially leak all bits of the private input. 
Timing-Channel Attack
While the termination-attack outlined above allows an attacker to leak information until the program diverges, an attack on the timing-channel comes with no such restrictions. The timing-attack on Barrier-DDSME exploits control-dependencies that lead to differences in the number of executed instructions until the barrier is reached. As it uses no loops, progress is inevitable. Hence, it can be executed repeatedly and thus potentially leak the complete private input bit by bit. We illustrate the attack in Figure 4 .
The attack follows the same pattern as the termination attack. However, instead of the loop, a conditional statement is used to conditionally delay the execution for one step. The body of the conditional references the classified information to ensure that it is part of the critical section. Consequently, the most efficient critical section ranges from line one to line four. The last line again accounts for the creation of an observable event after the critical section. We make the same assumptions about Alice's knowledge of the code and capability to observe events on the low channel. As in the termination-attack, she first observes the ⊥ event on the low channel, which leaks the dummy value. Next, she receives the event that was created after the critical section (contents do not matter here as well). From the time that has passed between the occurrences of these two events, she can infer one bit of the private input. If the private input was ⊥ as well, line four would not be executed by either of the two executions. Hence, the barrier would be reached early. If the private input was ⊤, the low execution would have to wait at the barrier until the high execution performed the output in line four. This delay interferes with the timing of the final low output event and thus allows Alice to infer the private input.
Note that this attack again relies on a fitting choice of the dummy value, which is not under Alice's control. If the dummy value leads to the longer execution trace, the delay could not have been attributed to the private input without doubt. However, because the attack does not crash the program, Alice could just try again in this case. Assuming that the dummy values are chosen randomly and that the private input does not change, she will eventually end up with the correct private input. Naturally, this implies a way to counter the attack. If the dummy values where chosen in a way that guarantees that the low execution always exhausts the worst case execution time (WCET), the attack would be thwarted. Unfortunately, this implies relinquishment of any potential savings, making this solution inefficient. Additionally, WCET analysis is very complex, especially on low-level code. Hence, we present our queue-based synchronization for DDSME in the next section. Our solution guarantees termination-and timing-sensitivity while allowing for efficient execution and preserving per-channel transparency.
TIMING-SENSITIVE DDSME
As outlined above, barrier-based Demand-Driven Secure Multi-Execution (DDSME) fails to enforce termination-and timing-sensitive non-interference. The indicated attacks show that an attacker in Figure 5 : Unsynchronized DDSME vs. Queue-DDSME control of the code can use the covert channels to infer information about the private input. The problem is a consequence of the implied dependency between the SME mode and subsequent singleexecution monitoring. Due to the barrier, the program can only progress once both the low and high executions have reached the end of the critical section. Our solution to the problem therefore aims making the progress of low and mid executions independent from the progress of high executions. Additionally, we aim to preserve per-channel transparency. This ensures that programs under our enforcement show similar behavior to unenforced execution. An important consequence of the transparency requirement is that we cannot simply abstain from any synchronization at all. To illustrate this, we consider the left side of Figure 5 . Here, we see an exemplary execution of a program where the critical section is entered twice. After it is entered for the first time, we switch to Secure Multi-Execution (SME) protection as usual. However, similar to the timing-attack, we now assume that the low execution reaches the end of the critical section early. Such a case may for example occur if the dummy values contain far less information than the private input and thus subsequent processing can progress faster. Under barrier-based DDSME, the low execution would now be stalled until the high execution has progressed to the end of the critical section as well. This could introduce the covert-channel vulnerabilities as described above. Instead, we allow that the low execution leaves the critical section independently of the high execution. Consequently, we switch from the transformed low execution semantics to the original single-execution under SLEM protection while running the high execution in parallel. Now, we are running in a mixed mode, where both the secretless execution and the still running high execution may produce high output. This may harm the transparency guarantees.
To illustrate this, we assume that the secretless execution encounters a write to a high channel. As depicted in the figure, the high execution may still be busy processing the initial private input. If we were to allow secretless execution to emit an event on the high channel, it could overtake events from the high execution.
Another problem of the mixed mode arises when the secretless execution requires input from the high channel. As that would harm the security, we would have to switch to SME mode again. However, this creates another high execution such that two high executions now run in parallel. As they might both write to the same channel, again an intransparent ordering of events could occur.
To overcome this problem, we propose our new queue-based Demand-Driven Secure Multi-Execution (Q-DDSME). The idea is illustrated on the right side of Figure 5 . We keep the immediate progress of low-and secretless executions to ensure decoupling from the high execution. However, we only allow a single high execution to be running at a time. Any additional high execution is queued until the previous high execution has terminated. This ensures that all events are created in the order of the critical sections and without race-conditions. Additionally, we also enqueue a copy of the secretless execution whenever it produces events for the high channel. This guarantees that also later high outputs cannot overtake events produced in the critical sections. Consequently, only the high thread is allows to produce output.
To prevent overtaking of high executions by secretless executions in the mixed mode, we also enqueue a new high execution whenever the secretless execution signals that it wants to emit high output. The additional enqueued high execution is supposed to delay the output until all currently running high executions are finished. As it should not have any additional effects, we terminate it one it has produced the desired output. The secretless execution meanwhile can continue unhindered.
In our approach, synchronization is only in one direction. The secretless execution enqueues states that should be performed using high execution semantics. The high thread executes these in order but no feedback is given to the secretless execution. Hence, the secretless execution is fully unaware of the high execution, which enables stronger security guarantees. We demonstrate these using the attacks from Section 3 in Section 4.1.
Naturally, our approach might interfere with the timing of high events. However, since the high channel is only observable by users with high security classification, there is no confidential information that could be leaked 2 . Note that we must use a queue of processes instead of events, as earlier high executions may change the state of the environment and thus affect the subsequent creation of high events.
Thwarting of Covert Attacks
To demonstrate the stronger security guarantees of our novel scheduler, we revisit the attacks from Section 3. First, we consider the termination-channel attack from Figure 3 . Here, we assumed that the private input leads the high execution into an endless loop, such that the low execution could not progress beyond the barrier. Now, using our novel queue-based scheduler, the attack is thwarted as can be seen in Figure 6 . Because the low execution can leave the critical section without having to wait for the high execution, the subsequent zero output to the low channel occurs as expected. Hence, from an attacker point of view, the occurrence of the zero output does not allow inference of the private inputs.
The same holds true for the timing-channel attack from Figure 4 . Here, the original attack exploited a delay in the occurrence of the zero output, that was dependent on the private input. Using our Consequently, the timing of event on the low channel is now also independent of the private inputs.
Note that there may still be a very slight delay in low outputs if the scheduler runs on a single core system. On a single core system, a running secretless execution must share the processing resources with potentially present high execution. Once the high execution leaves the critical section, the secretless execution can take full possession of the processor and speed up. Consequently, the acceleration/deceleration of low outputs creates a timing side-channel that could be used to infer the high inputs. This situation has been discussed in depth in works related to ours, which we discuss in Section 6. For the implementation of our prototype, we assumed a multi-core machine and left the scheduling to the operating system. In the next section, we provide practical evidence of the security and transparency guarantees of our approach.
EVALUATION
To demonstrate the practicality of our approach, we extended our implementation of Demand-Driven Secure Multi-Execution enforcement for compiled code with queue-based synchronization. The implementation uses most of the tricks introduced in [16] . Most importantly, it relies on fork injection to create copies of the process at run-time. However, our implementation is split into two threads. The main thread runs the secure copy of the execution, while the other thread executes the high run from the queue. Whenever the main thread switches to SME semantics or emits an event on the high channel, it enqueues a copy of the current state and immediately continues execution. The high thread dequeues and executes these states in order and thus takes care of transparency. The reasoning behind the multi-threaded implementation is to achieve a high degree of decoupling between the low and high executions. This minimizes the risk of side-channel vulnerabilities, while also allowing for efficient parallel execution. To achieve this, we need to pass tracing control between threads. For this, we automatically detach from the cloned process in a way that keeps it suspended. When the clone is dequeued, the high thread attaches to it and resumes execution.
In the following, we provide evidence for the efficiency, security and transparency of our approach. We do this using the example binary cat from the coreutils collection. cat copies the contents of a list of files to the terminal. Because it does so in order of the files, it effectively concatenates the files it is provided. In our scenario, we provide cat with classified and unclassified files of various sizes and measure metrics with regard to resources and time.
Efficiency
To measure the efficiency of our approach, we used the performance analysis tool perf. Efficiency can be measured with different metrics, for example run-time, cycles or number of instructions. We decided to use userland instructions, as it is almost completely independent of the environment. While run-time includes waiting for I/O, overall load on the processor, and scheduling by the operating system, userland instructions give a close estimate of the length of the execution path. Naturally, if more instructions are needed to achieve the same behavior, the execution is considered to be less efficient.
For cat, the number of executed instructions (i.e., the length of the execution path) depends on the amount of input that is processed. On our evaluation machine, cat reads and processes blocks of 131072 (= 2 17 ) bytes. Each block requires 107 instructions to be handled under native execution. Another 196373 instructions are necessary to start and end the process. Hence, we can derive an efficiency function ρ for native cat that takes the size of the input as a parameter: ρ cat nat ive (n) = 196373 + ⌊n/131072⌋ * 107 We can do the same for full Secure Multi-Execution (SME) protection, barrier-based Demand-Driven Secure Multi-Execution (DDSME), and our novel queue-based variety (Q-DDSME). The measured efficiency function for the SME protection is: ρ cat S M E (n) = 697971 + ⌊n/131072⌋ * 1626 , which is more than twice the resources for the process and nearly 16 times the instructions per block. Note that we use ptrace as the tracing environment, which is far from optimal. In the future, more efficient solutions could be substituted. However, since we are mostly interested in a comparison between the various approaches and all our measurements use the same code base, this is sufficient for now.
For the demand-driven optimization, we use a single classified file, that is processed within the critical section. This implies that only one thread is enqueued with our approach and only one barrier is created with the barrier-based approach. Since our implementations of both techniques share most of their code, DDSME and Q-DDSME result in equal efficiency for this test. Naturally, the larger the amount of classified information, the longer we stay in SME mode. Hence, the increment of the DDSME function for processing classified information is similar to that of traditional SME. However, since the rest of the program does not have to be duplicated, the initial cost are significantly lower. The overall function we measured is:
As can be seen, the increment is a little bit higher, which means that DDSME becomes less efficient for very large inputs. In fact, the two approaches break even when processing roughly around 400 MB of classified data. However, when using unclassified information, DDSME can skip multi-execution whereas traditional SME cannot (as outlined in Section 2.6). Consequently, the efficiency function for DDSME protection of legal flows from low channels to high channels is:
Here, not only the initial costs are lower, but also the increment is significantly lower than that of SME. In practical use, we expect most cases to be between these two extremes. A graph showing all measured cost functions can be seen in Figure 7 .
We have also measured the impact of enqueuing more threads. For this, we split a thirty block input (≈ 4 MB) into up to thirty files and used a critical section that encompasses processing of a single file. Hence, it is entered and left increasingly often. As the results in Figure 8 show, unoptimized SME outperforms Q-DDSME when classified input is spread across many files. Note however, that this is the extreme case where more or less each processed chunk (of roughly 130 KB each) required the creation of a new thread and additional monitoring overhead. We expect most practical cases to use larger critical sections. In our case, this could be solved by using a critical section that terminates once all files are processed instead of after each file. Note also that the results show that DDSME performs even worse, however this might be due to our suboptimal implementation, which is derived from the Q-DDSME prototype using a one-place-queue. These results raise a promising question for further research regarding the optimal balance between Q-DDSME and SME.
Finally, we experimented with the tightest possible critical section that only encompasses processing of a single block. This means that the classification of each block is checked individually. Hence, any cloned high execution terminates after processing a single block. However, our implementation classifies and replaces complete files. Consequently, if the classified file is replaced with a shorter dummy file in the low execution, fewer high executions are started than necessary. The resulting output high channels is therefore dependent on the length of the dummy file. The problem can be solved by declassifying the length of the actual input, or by using the per-file critical section instead.
Overall, our performance measurements show that Q-DDSME promises to be more efficient than SME in many realistic cases. Next, we show that is provides stronger security guarantees than barrier-based implementations.
Timing-Sensitivity
As mentioned above, we expect our queue-based Demand-Driven Secure Multi-Execution (Q-DDSME) to be timing-sensitive, as the low events are created independently from the high executions.
Conversely, we expect our barrier-based scheduling strategy to be timing-insensitive, as the creation of low events may be delayed at the barrier. If the run-time of the high execution exceeds the run-time of the low execution, the low execution must wait at the barrier until the high execution reaches the join. Any subsequent production of low-observable events must wait as well.
To test this, we ran both variants in the same setup. We used the narrow bounds to leave the critical section after each file and passed two files to cat. The first file contains the secret and is replaced with empty dummy values at run-time. The second file contains public information that should be written to a low-observable output. If the size of the secret file influences the timestamp of the low write, we consider the strategy to be timing-insensitive. As can be seen in Figure 9 , the timestamps of the low write clearly depend on the size of the secret information for the barrier-bases strategy. Conversely, they do not depend on the secret information for the queue-based synchronization.
We used a similar setup to asses the termination-sensitivity of our scheduling strategies. Here, we are considering what Ngo et al. termed indirect termination-sensitivity (ITSNI) [15] . Our strategies enforce ITSNI, if the occurrence of low-observable events is not indefinitely delayed by a diverging high execution. To test this, we ran the above setup using an infinite input stream as the secret channel. As expected, no low write occurs in the barrier-based scheduling variant, meaning that it does not enforce ITSNI. Conversely, the low-write occurs normally in the queue-based scheduling. However, the monitoring process never terminates. This supports the (im)possibility results by Ngo et al. [15] .
Transparency
Unfortunately, there is no direct metric to measure per-channel transparency. However, we tested various configurations of our prototype to confirm that all messages occurred in the correct order. For example, throughout our test with the input spread across many files, the protected cat worked correctly in concatenating it back to the original input. We also tested mixing classified with unclassified files and replacing classified information with dummy values. In a realistic scenario it may be impossible to predict how much and what kind of dummy values are suited for replacement. We therefore believe that making the provisioning of dummy values a reactive process is a promising direction for future work.
With our evaluation, we provide evidence that our approach is applicable to low-level code, more efficient than SME in most scenarios, more secure than barrier-based Demand-Driven Secure Multi-Execution, and preserves per-channel transparency. We compare our work to related research in the following section and conclude our work in Section 7.
RELATED WORK
An in-depth discussion of the timing-guarantees from various scheduling strategies can be found in [13] . The authors generalize the idea of SME enforcement by dividing it into two parts. First, the program is partitioned to sub-programs, each responsible for computations on one level of the lattice. These subprograms are then scheduled such that the resulting traces are termination-and timing-sensitive. They provide various scheduling strategies and classify their security guarantees. Common to the schedulers above is the goal to eliminate timing channels despite scheduling parts of the code such that they must wait for the termination of earlier parts. This is only possible if the schedule moves strictly upwards in the lattice. However, this may not always be possible for reactive programs, where low executions and high executions interleave. Full SME Q-DDSME High (Q-)DDSME Low DDSME High For example, in their seminal paper on Secure Multi-Execution, Rafnsson and Sabelfeld [17] state that the low-prio scheduler introduced in [9] (and used for example FlowFox [8] ) suffers from a timing-vulnerability in this case. Consequently, they propose a fair interleaving scheduler where scheduling decisions are independent on the behavior of the various executions. The result is similar to parallel execution and enables termination-and timingsensitive non-interference. However, the authors also note that a side-channel may be created when using a barrier. They propose a variant of SME that can be used for detection of interference. In the fully transparent version, the low outputs of all executions are compared to detect differences in the observable behavior at run-time.
To be able to compare executions in similar states, the executions need to be synchronized. This is achieved using barriers, similar to the barrier used for DDSME. The authors note that this makes the approach timing-insensitive and propose to use timeouts or an additional layer of obfuscation to close this channel. The use of a timeout is also at the core of the termination-sensitive scheduling of Faceted Secure Multi-Execution (FSME) [21] . In FSME, a program is run under Multiple-Facets (MF) semantics [1] to save resources. When the executions paths diverge due to an implicit flow, FSME switches to SME semantics. Once both execution paths converged again, execution continues under MF semantics. To eliminate the termination-channel, a timeout is used to ensure that the executions progress eventually. However, if the timeout is too large, it may still be possible to leak information through the timing-channel. On the other hand, if it is too small, the execution may get stuck in less efficient SME mode and waste resources. Because the states from different executions are merged under FSME, we are unsure whether our queue-based scheduling can be applied here. With a focus on the transparency of Secure Multi-Execution, Zanarini et al. [26] proposed SME Monitoring. In their approach, the original program is run alongside its protected duplicate. This native execution does not emit outputs but their order is replayed by the SME-protected execution. The advantage of this approach is that SME can be made fully transparent as the scheduler has knowledge about the precise ordering of the original program. The obvious downside of this approach is that it requires yet another copy to run alongside the SME derivatives.
CONCLUSION
While Secure Multi-Execution (SME) is a promising direction for precise information flow control, it comes with a high resource demand and is technically complex to implement. To alleviate this, more efficient variants have been proposed that use SME only for parts of the execution (e.g. Demand-Driven Secure Multi-Execution). When the security of the execution can be guaranteed by other techniques, efficient SME solutions switch to cheaper enforcement. Unfortunately, this switch can lead to information leaks through timing side-channels. In this paper, we have shown that the often discussed, barrier-based synchronization mechanism is indeed vulnerable to covert attacks. To solve this problem, we proposed a novel, queue-based synchronization approach that allows for interleaving of different enforcement modes. This way, executions aware of classified information can be decoupled from secretless executions, consequently guaranteeing termination-and timingsensitive non-interference. To demonstrate the applicability of our approach, we have implemented a queue-based Demand-Driven Secure Multi-Execution engine targeting compiled binaries. In our evaluation we could show that our implementation is more efficient than traditional Secure Multi-Execution and provides the same security guarantees. This is an important step towards automatic software confidentiality enforcement for existing code. In the future, our approach could be extended to include more features such as multi-threaded code, making it even more practical.
